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APPELLATE CASELOAD: MEETING THE 
CHALLENGE IN RHODE ISLAND 
Joseph R. Weisberger* 
Two of the most challenging and frustrating problems facing appellate 
courts in America are increasingly congested dockets and the sluggish 
pace of litigation. In an effort to combat these problems, the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island has recently initiated several procedural tech-
niques for screening and settling criminal and civil cases on appeal. 
These techniques have proven highly effective and should provide other 
appellate courts at least a partial answer to the burgeoning appellate 
caseload. 
I. RHODE ISLAND'S APPELLATE BACKLOG AS IMPETUS FOR CHANGE 
At its inception under the state constitution in 1843, the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island functioned as both a trial court and an ap-
pellate court. 1 In 1905 the court was made solely an appellate tribunal 
and its membership was set at five justices. The trial court duties were 
assigned to the superior court. Since 1905 the superior court has more 
than doubled in size. New tribunals have been created from which 
appeals are taken directly to the supreme court. 2 Some cases decided 
on administrative appeal by the district courts may be reviewed by the 
supreme court on a petition for certiorari. 3 Yet Rhode Island has no 
intermediate state court. Consequently, the crush of appellate litigation 
has fallen on the supreme court, though its membership after eighty 
years remains fixed at five. 
Given these developments, it is hardly surprising that the workload 
of the court has significantly increased in recent years. For example, 
in the last decade the number of cases filed in the court approximately 
• Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Rhode Island. A.B., 1942, Brown University; J .D., 
1949, Harvard University. 
I. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island can trace its lineage to colonial times when it was 
known as "The Superior Court of Judicature, Court of Assize and General Gaol Delivery." 
At that time and for more than a century thereafter, Rhode Island had a charter granted by 
King Charles II in 1663 as its basic governing document. This structure was replaced in 1843 
by a constitution adopted by a state convention in East Greenwich in 1842. 
2. These tribunals include the Family Court, consisting of eleven judges, and the Worker's 
Compensation Commission, consisting of five members. 
3. There are 13 justices of the district courts. 
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doubled, from 325 in 1972 to 634 in 1981. During that .same period, 
however, dispositions by opinion remained relatively static, increasing 
from 189 in 1972 to 205 in 1981. This represented an output of 
approximately forty-one opinions per judge in 1981, a workload that 
has been suggested by one commentator to be a maximum quality out-
put per judge in an appellate court. 4 Thus, Rhode Island was faced 
with an ever-mounting caseload, a limited judicial work force, and 
the realization that the opinion output of each judge could not be 
significantly increased without reducing the quality of the work product. 
Moreover, the complexity of opinions was also increasing with the 
multiplication of decision points involved in each case. For example, 
appeals in criminal cases have not only increased significantly in ab-
solute numbers since 1972, but they also involve an almost geometrical 
increase in constitutional issues rarely encountered prior to 1960. Each 
term of the Supreme Court of the United States has created new pro-
cedural safeguards for criminal defendants. Complexities relating to 
search and seizure, right to counsel, in-custody interrogation, eyewitness 
identification, right to confrontation, and speedy trial (to mention only 
a few) cause each opinion in a criminal case to involve many more 
issues and considerably more hours of work to complete than was 
necessary even a decade ago. 
It became obvious to the members of the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island that merely increasing the number of opinions would not achieve 
the desired result of bringing case dispositions into balance with case 
filings. Therefore, new procedures and devices had to be established 
to increase the number of dispositions without formal written opinion 
or full briefing and argument. 
An examination of cases on the calendar, including those presented 
for final argument, disclosed that many cases both civil and criminal 
involved issues of settled law, issues of fact where the scope of review 
was extremely narrow, or legal contentions that could readily be 
perceived to be without merit. In some cases it was equally obvious 
that the court below had committed an error of law that could be 
detected summarily without the full briefing and argument processes. 
Consequently, the court developed techniques and procedures for rapidly 
bringing to the surface cases susceptible of summary determination 
without the application of the full panoply of the appellate processes. 
The court proceeded to establish a means in both criminal and civil 
cases to place such appeals on faster tracks suitable for the disposition 
of the issues presented. 
At the same time, the court accepted full responsibility for manage-
4. See R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 9 (1976). 
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ment of cases upon the filing of the notice of appeal. 5 This rule change 
set the stage for eliminating a significant segment of appellate delay 
that occurs between filing a notice of appeal in the trial court and 
docketing the appeal with the accompanying transcript and record in 
the appellate court. 6 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, having set 
the stage, began to implement fast-track procedures in earnest. 
II. EXPEDITED HANDLING OF CRIMINAL APPEALS: 
PROVISIONAL ORDER 16 
Provisional Order 167 was designed by the court to provide a flexible 
and efficient method of dealing with criminal appeals. The aim was 
to examine criminal appeals at an early stage in the proceedings and 
determine at that point whether a full appellate process was necessary 
and appropriate. The examination involves the following steps: 
(1) Within twenty (20) days after the filing of the case record 
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, the appellant is re-
quired to file a statement of the case and a brief summary 
of the issues proposed to be argued on appeal. This docu-
ment is required .to be concise, not to exceed five (5) pages. 
(2) Within fifteen (15) days after the filing of the appellant's 
statement, the appellee or other responding party is per-
mitted to file a counter statement. 
(3) Upon the filing of the counter statement or the expiration 
of the time for filing, whichever is earlier, the clerk 
schedules a pre briefing conference. This conference is con-
ducted by a single justice of the Supreme Court (chosen 
on a rotating basis) and attended by counsel for all par-
ties. After hearing the oral comments of counsel and con-
sidering the written statements filed, the single justice will 
5. The rules of appellate procedure were amended in 1979 to achieve this objective. See R.I. 
SUP. CT. R. ll(g): 
From the time of the filing of notice of appeal, the Supreme Court and trial courts 
shall have concurrent jurisdiction to supervise the course of said appeal and to pro-
mulgate orders of dismissal of appeal for failure to comply with these rules, either upon 
motion of a party or upon the court's own motion. 
From the time of the docketing of an appeal in the Supreme Court, said court shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction to supervise the further course of such appeal and enter such 
orders as may be appropriate, including orders of dismissal for failure to comply with 
these rules, either on motion of a party or on its own motion. 
This new procedure is in accord with the ABA Standards for Appellate Courts. See STANDARDS 
RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS §§ 3.50-3.51 (1977). 
6. See J. MARTIN & E. PRESCOTT, APPELLATE COURT DELAY xv-xvi (1981). 
7. R.I. SuP. CT. R. 12, PROVISIONAL ORDER No. 16. 
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enter an order which may require further action as follows: 
(a) That the case be fully briefed and argued. 
(b) That a specific briefing schedule be adopted. 
(c) That specific appeals be consolidated. 
(d) That the case be remanded for specific action such 
as evidentiary hearings or entry by the trial court of 
necessary orders. 
(e) That a show cause order be issued requiring either 
the appellant's attorney or the responding party's at-
torney to appear before the full court prior to brief-
ing to show cause why the judgment or order appealed 
from should not be summarily affirmed or reversed 
without further briefing or argument. 
(f) That when show cause orders are issued, counsel for 
either side be permitted, if desired, to amplify the 
prebriefing statements previously filed with an addi-
tional supplemental statement not to exceed ten (10) 
pages in length. The supplemental statements may in-
clude issues not set forth in the original statements 
so as to permit the argument of points first brought 
to light in the conference: 
(4) Show cause arguments are heard by the full court and are 
normally limited to ten minutes on each side. After argu-
ment, the court may take any of the following actions: 
(a) It may order that the case be fully briefed and argued. 
(b) It may order that additional issues be argued on 
appeal. 
(c) It may remand the case for specific actions such as 
evidentiary hearings or entry by the trial court of 
necessary orders. 
(d) It may order that a case be assigned to a specific 
schedule for briefing or oral argument. 
(e) It may order that cases be consolidated. 
(f) It may order that the judgment or order appealed 
from be summarily affirmed or reversed with no fur-
ther briefing or argument. 
(g) It may order that the appeal be briefed and argued 
but only on specific issues and that other issues 
previously proposed to be briefed and argued not be 
pursued. 8 
Implementing these procedures enabled the supreme court to reduce 
8. This synopsis is a paraphrase of the original at id. 919l(a)-(f). 
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significantly the backlog of criminal cases pending in the court in less 
than two years. Prebriefing conferences were held in 107 cases, and 
show cause orders were issued in sixty-eight cases. Of the forty-two 
show cause hearings held between September 1, 1981 and October 13, 
1982, sixty-seven percent were disposed by summary order. Of those 
disposed by summary order, forty-three percent resulted in the appeal 
being dismissed and twenty-four percent resulted in reversal of the 
conviction. 
The new procedures also cut back the workload on both defense 
and prosecution attorneys in cases where the court finds summary 
disposition appropriate. Heavily burdened appellate counsel for both 
the Attorney General and the Public Def ender are no longer required 
to spend inordinate time briefing and arguing cases that do not merit 
such attention. Consequently, they have more time to prepare briefs 
and arguments in cases where the issues are appropriate for the full 
panoply of appellate responses. It should be emphasized that at every 
stage of these new procedures, the single justice and the full court 
exercise extreme care to insure that no case is assigned for summary 
disposition unless it involves issues of settled law, issues of fact where 
the trial justice cannot be found to be clearly wrong, or such clear 
error on the part of the trial court that summary reversal is appropriate. 
Even with only one year of experience under these procedures, results 
have been so positive that the court, counsel on the staff of the Attorney 
General, the Public Def ender, and the private defense bar have con-
cluded that this is a helpful decision-making device for the court. 9 
Attorneys interviewed from the private defense bar, however, were 
somewhat more negative than the institutional attorneys in their assess-
ment of the merits of the fast-track procedures. Their criticisms in-
cluded the time limitations which required attorneys to change their 
work habits and the fear that some issues might be overlooked in the 
fast-track process. 10 One must, of course, realize that any effort to 
shorten the period within which an attorney is required to respond is 
likely to meet with some degree of criticism. It is not unusual for 
members of the bar to resist change, particularly if that change is likely 
to disturb a condition of relative repose. 
Most of the cases disposed of through show cause hearings are ter-
minated by a brief order, often less than a page, ~hich is dictated 
almost immediately after the hearing by the justice to whom the case 
is assigned. In some instances, where a statement of facts and a reference 
to a legal principle are deemed appropriate, a short per curiam opinion 
9. See L. Olson & J. Chapper, Screening and Tracking Criminal Appeals: The Rhode Island 
Experience 16 (March 1983) (available from ABA Action Comm. to Reduce Court Costs). 
10. Id. at 16-19. 
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will suffice. Seldom will such an opinion exceed two pages. 11 This pur-
suit of brevity illustrates the Rhode Island court's belief that no useful 
purpose is served in responding at length to issues adequately handled 
by an order or a brief per curiam opinion. Opinion writing should 
not be converted into "a massive art form" to be produced solely for 
its own sake. 12 The members of the Rhode Island Supreme Court are 
unanimously of the opinion that the safeguards of the conference before 
a single justice, the prebriefing statements and supplemental statements, 
and a hearing before the full court on a show cause argument are 
adequate guarantees to insure that no significant issue will be 
overlooked and that every case that merits full briefing and argu-
ment will receive the full formality of appellate treatment. The court 
has attempted to meet these same goals in the civil appeals process. 
Ill. EXPEDITED HANDLING OF CIVIL APPEALS: 
RULES 16(g) AND 16(h) 
To meet the burgeoning criminal appeals caseload, the Rhode Island 
court, not unlike courts in sister jurisdictions, gave precedence to 
criminal appeals over civil appeals. For approximately two years, though 
criminal appeals constituted less than thirty percent of total filings, 
sixty percent of the calendar time for regular argument was devoted 
to hearing criminal appeals. This had the inevitable effect of creating 
a massive backlog of civil appeals. This backlog demanded an immediate 
and vigorous response. 
As with criminal appeals, many civil appeals involved questions of 
settled law or questions of fact with an extremely limited scope of review. 
For example, a decision by a trial justice to grant or deny a motion 
for new trial must be upheld unless the trial justice overlooks or 
misconceives material evidence or is clearly wrong. 13 Nevertheless, such 
decisions often spawn appeals where counsel will assiduously argue that 
the trial justice was clearly wrong when, in fact, the argument is over 
a factual matter that should have been made to the tribunal below. 
These arguments illustrate the attorney's disagreement with the trial 
justice, but in no way demonstrate that the trial justice was clearly 
wrong or overlooked or misconceived material evidence. To combat 
11. Professor Leflar sensibly advocates that straightforward decisions be settled with straightfor-
ward opinions: "For a decision that simply follows established authority, it is necessary only 
to cite that authority and say that it is controlling; a lengthier statement serves no useful pur-
pose. If no basis for appeal is found, there may be nothing to write about." R. LEFLAR, supra 
note 4, at 52. 
12. Id. (quoting former Harvard Law School Dean Irwin Griswold). 
13. See, e.g., Handy v. Geary, 105 R.l. 419, 252 A.2d 435 (1969); Turenne v. Carl G. Olson, 
Co., 94 R.I. 177, 179 A.2d 323 (1962). 
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these abuses the Supreme Court of Rhode Island had implemented Rule 
16(g), which permitted the responding party in an appeal to move to 
summarily affirm a decision of the tribunal below within ten days after 
receipt of the appellant's or other moving party's opening brief. 14 
In 1979 the court determined that it would add to the rule 16(g) 
procedures by introducing settlement conferences at the appellate level. 
These settlement conferences were conducted by a single justice of the 
supreme court and were designed wherever possible to bring about the 
disposition of cases without briefing or argument. The members of 
the court initially had hoped that these conferences might be con-
ducted by a retired justice; however, no retired justice was available 
so the task was rotated among the active members of the court. 
These conferences required a great deal of tact and forbearance 
on the part of the justice conducting the conference. Although the ob-
jective was promoting settlement, to avoid the possibility that the con-
ference justice might be thought to have indicated a prejudgment or 
bias in the event that it was necessary for the case to be decided in 
the ordinary course, the conference justice had to avoid expressing 
opinions on any legal issues involved except in the most antiseptic and 
general sense. 
Despite these handicaps, the program initially met with great suc-
cess. During the first year of operation, approximately thirty-five per-
cent of the cases submitted to settlement conference were resolved by 
agreement of the parties. At that time, however, the justice in charge 
of the program was selecting cases for their settlement potential. As 
a result of recommendations made by the National Center for State 
Courts, an experimental program was initiated to determine whether 
similar success could be achieved without preselection. Two groups of 
cases were selected at random: one group was submitted to settlement 
conference and the other, which acted as a control group, was allowed 
to proceed in the normal appellate course. During the year that this 
experiment was in force, twenty-six percent of the cases submitted to 
conference were settled or otherwise disposed; only four percent of 
the control group were resolved during the same period. This indicated 
rather forcefully that the judicial time involved in settlement conferences 
was worthwhile. 
After the experimental period ended, cases were again preselected for 
their settlement potential. Certain types of cases, such as custody 
14. The grounds for such motion were: 
(I) The issue on appeal is clearly controlled by settled· Rhode Island law; (2) the issue 
on appeal is factual and clearly there is sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict, 
decision on the motion for new trial or the findings of fact below; or (3) the issue 
on appeal is one of judicial discretion and clearly there is no abuse of discretion below. 
R.I. SUP. CT. R. 16(g). This rule had been in effect since 1974 but did not then provide for 
the issuance of a show cause order by the court, nor did it provide for a prebriefing conference. 
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disputes in domestic relations matters, cases involving alienation of 
affections, libel and slander, trespass to real estate, prescriptive rights 
of way, and other matters where the emotional impact of the case may 
exceed the parties' interest in monetary value, proved to be less fruit-
ful in producing settlements. Consequently, such cases have generally 
not been included in the settlement mix. 
It became apparent during the two years that settlement conferences 
were held that many cases in the appellate pipeline involved the type 
of issues enumerated in Rule 16(g), but no motions to affirm had been 
filed. In addition, some cases involved procedural defects, unobserved 
by either counsel, that made it necessary to remand the case to the 
trial court. Further, in some cases the tribunal below had committed 
an obvious error of law which required reversal or remand. No pro-
cedural device was available for handling this last group of cases without 
full briefing and argument and the ultimate writing of an opinion. 
Consequently, in February 1982, the court adopted Rule 16(h), 
authorizing the court to require parties to file a short statement of 
their respective positions after the docketing of an appeal in a civil 
case. 15 The rule also provided for appearance before a single justice 
of the court for a settlement conference during which the issues on 
appeal might also be determined. 16 The rule further authorized the con-
ference justice to issue an order to either party to show cause why 
the appeal should not be dismissed, the judgment below reversed or 
modified, or the matter remanded for further proceedings. 11 
Unlike the criminal show cause orders, hearings in the civil cases 
were allowed to be conducted before a hearing panel consisting of three 
justices. 18 The hearing panel had the power to issue an order dismissing 
the appeal, reversing or modifying the judgment, or remanding the 
case to the appropriate court for further proceedings. 19 The panel was 
also empowered in appropriate circumstances to place the case on the 
regular calendar for full hearing and argument. 20 Thus, except for the 
size of the panel that heard the show cause arguments, Rule 16(h) 
generally paralleled the provisions relating to the summary disposition 
of criminal cases. 
Smaller hearing panels enabled the court to hear more cases on show 
cause argument without involving the entire court, thus increasing the 
capacity of the justices to deal with such cases. Presently, each justice 
devotes one week per month to civil settlement conferences and criminal 
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conferences, and show cause argument hearings are held each month 
by a rotating panel of the court. Typically, a hearing panel will con-
sider fifteen civil cases on a day selected for show cause hearings. During 
the past year, sixty-three percent of the cases placed upon the show 
cause calendar were disposed of by summary order or brief per curiam 
opinion. Thus, the summary and fast track procedures for civil cases 
appear to be at least as successful as those developed in the criminal area. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has recently undertaken some 
important procedural changes to deal with increased case filings and 
the resulting backlog. It has adopted techniques for screening and settling 
both criminal and civil cases by identifying and dealing with appeals 
that do not require or merit the full ceremonial response involved in 
the complete appellate process. The screening, identification, and sum-
mary disposition of such cases have given the court more time to re-
spond to those cases demanding a clarification of the law, promulgation 
of new rules, or constitutional adjudication. We recognize that all ap-
pellate courts have a duty to guarantee just procedures and fair results 
in civil and criminal litigation, but articulating new legal principles and 
clarifying settled law are equally important, if more occasional, func-
tions. Unnecessary proliferation of written opinions, especially lengthy 
opinions, should not be encouraged. Responding to frivolous issues 
raised on appeal, or spending scarce judicial time analyzing and respond-
ing to arguments foredoomed to but one conclusion, is an inappropriate 
allocation of judicial resources. 
Consequently, we recommend the modest homeopathic summary pro-
cedures adopted by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island to any court 
of similar jurisdiction that finds it impossible to deal with an expanding 
caseload by the traditional response of increasing the output of judicial 
opinions. 
In a previous article I suggested that the appellate structure of our 
judicial system resembles a great, full-rigged ship, some of whose seams 
have been opened below the waterline by the incessant pounding of 
the seas. 21 If the crew of appellate judges is to prevent the vessel from 
foundering, it is necessary that the pumping process be improved. A 
precarious balance between sailing and sinking is not the only objec-
tive. We no longer can afford the luxury of applying to every case 
brought before us the analysis typical of a writer of a law review article 
regardless of the merits of the questions raised. 
21. Weisberger, Appellate Courts: The Challenge of Inundation, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 237, 237 
(1982). 

